Space Technology

By: masood
sinkhole routing. While this may sound a lot like some Star Trek episode, it’s important for us to understand what each is, and more so how to implement them. Sinkholes are designed to attract traffic and keep it (for analysis or whatever reason). Blockhouse, on the other hand, are designed to attract traffic and never let it be seen again. In larger networks (and what we simulate in our CCIE labs) both of these techniques are typically done via BGP. So let’s start with the sinkhole idea. To create a sinkhole, we want to attract traffic. The first question we need to ask is Why? Whenever you advertise a network out, you inadvertently attract traffic to that IPs. That traffic may be good, or it may be bad. From a security perspective, I’m sure everyone has heard the term Honeypot used before. There is a specific purpose to attract traffic. So let’s say that you have a /24 network advertising to the Internet through various connections. Traffic can come in and wend its way through your network to the destination network segment. You notice a Dos attack, or some huge amount of traffic towards one of your web servers. Where do you secure against this? How do you secure against it? Are you still moving traffic all the way through your network to one final router before the segment? Are you tying up all your link’s bandwidth while doing this? Sinkholes spread throughout your network are a way to break apart and analyze the traffic, perhaps cleaning it and moving the good stuff on through. But multiple routers would need a focal point, or different way to route that traffic. You may simply change the destination for a single IP out of that /24. Most-specific routing always wins, so that’s an easy way. Maybe you have multiple analysis points in your network to segment the traffic and reduce load and bottlenecks in your topology. Either way, follow the lab instructions and you are creating a sinkhole. You may even be advertising extra networks just to attract traffic for analysis (like a Honeypot idea). Just watch what’s being asked, but that’s the concept of a sinkhole. Blackhole routing on the other hand wants to kill traffic. Simply enough, we could go to all of our routers and install some Null0 routes. In real life, this is not a scalable approach. Hence the term remotely-triggered blackhole routing, and we’ll use BGP. Killing a route via a routing protocol is not a simple concept. No matter how hard we try when advertising a route, Null0 is not a valid next-hop to pass along to someone else! So every router needs to have a seed route to Null0. Pick something that isn’t used. Ip route 1.1.1.1 255.255.255.255 null0 That goes on every single router now. Of course, we would also have BGP setup between all of our internal routers. Perhaps not really moving any “real” routing information, just used to kill things. Now we need the trigger. On a central router (wherever an admin is anyway) we’ll do our maintenance for what routes we want to kill. Ip route 192.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 null0 tag 86 ip route 100.100.100.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86 ip route 200.200.200.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86 Notice the tag on those static routes. This will be used for redistribution to help only get the “bad” routes from a router that may actually have many other static routes. Ok, not in the real lab, but we’re pretending that the skills we learn on our way to CCIE have some real-life intrinsic value, right? So once we have decided on our central router what routes we want to kill everywhere, then we pass them out through BGP. Route-map KillRoutes permit 10 Match tag 86 Router bgp 65000 Redistribute static route-map KillRoutes That all seems very simple, right? Well, yes it does, but it won’t help us. At this point, all of our iBGP routers would see the central router as the next hop for each of the routes. Ok, yes, that creates a blackhole. Because it pulls all of the packets into the middle of our network and then kills them locally with a Null0 next-hop. But we are wasting LOTS of bandwidth in doing this. Always filter as close to the source as possible. Good design rules! In order to do this, we need to change the next hop of the route from our central router’s IP address to that of the distributed Null0 route (1.1.1.1 in my example). Route-map NH-Change permit 10 Match tag 86 Set ip next-hop 1.1.1.1 Route-map NH-Change permit 20 Router bgp 65000 Neighbor x.x.x.x route-map NH-Change out (repeat for each of your neighbors unless you’re using peer groups!) The last permit statement of the route-map was to pass-through any other routes that you may want to run in BGP unchanged. Only make the next-hop change for those routes that are evil. You could also set this next-hop within the original redistribute route-map. I just split it out for pointing out the differences. At this point, all of your other routers have learned some routes via iBGP, with a next-hop of 1.1.1.1 and since they have a local static route to Null0 for that next hop, all routes learned this way will be killed. We have now used blackhole routing in a remotely-triggered manner. Kinda cool, huh? Not difficult either, just a matter of thinking about what we are trying to accomplish. As noted, these techniques have been listed more explicitly on both the Security (2.0) and Service Provider CCIE tracks. I don’t see any reason why they can’t be used in Routing & Switching as well, so it never hurts to think these things through! For some extra information, check out: scenario carefully. Makes notes and diagrams as necessary, but think like the router does. Think things through one step at a time and all of these complicated things suddenly become much easier. Cheers, Scott Scott Morris is IPexpert's Vice President of Curriculum and Senior Technical Instructor. With over 20 years of technical training and consulting experience and a wealth of technical certifications, Scott Morris has proven to be among the elite in the technical training industry. Scott is one of the few people in the world who currently hold four separate CCIE certifications, but is one-of-a-kind by having added Juniper Network's expert level certification. He is also actively preparing for the CCIE Voice. Scott has years of experience both writing and teaching CCIE lab preparation materials with an outstanding track record of success. Over the past seven years, Scott has also been involved in many aspects of training directly for Cisco's internal staff on a variety of advanced technical topics. His knowledge and real-world experiences have been sought after for many projects. Scott has also participated in editing, writing and reviewing training books for Cisco Press, Wylie, Sybil, Que. Publishing and McGraw-Hill. His contributing author work includes Cisco Press' Managing Cisco Network Security book ( ISBN: 1578701031) - Chapters on the PIX Firewall; and Cisco Press' CCIE Practical Studies, Vol. 2 (ISBN: 1587050722) - Chapter on Multicast. Scott can be reached sinkhole routing. While this may sound a lot like some Star Trek episode, it’s important for us to understand what each is, and more so how to implement them. Sinkholes are designed to attract traffic and keep it (for analysis or whatever reason). Blockhouse, on the other hand, are designed to attract traffic and never let it be seen again. In larger networks (and what we simulate in our CCIE labs) both of these techniques are typically done via BGP. So let’s start with the sinkhole idea. To create a sinkhole, we want to attract traffic. The first question we need to ask is Why? Whenever you advertise a network out, you inadvertently attract traffic to that IPs. That traffic may be good, or it may be bad. From a security perspective, I’m sure everyone has heard the term Honeypot used before. There is a specific purpose to attract traffic. So let’s say that you have a /24 network advertising to the Internet through various connections. Traffic can come in and wend its way through your network to the destination network segment. You notice a Dos attack, or some huge amount of traffic towards one of your web servers. Where do you secure against this? How do you secure against it? Are you still moving traffic all the way through your network to one final router before the segment? Are you tying up all your link’s bandwidth while doing this? Sinkholes spread throughout your network are a way to break apart and analyze the traffic, perhaps cleaning it and moving the good stuff on through. But multiple routers would need a focal point, or different way to route that traffic. You may simply change the destination for a single IP out of that /24. Most-specific routing always wins, so that’s an easy way. Maybe you have multiple analysis points in your network to segment the traffic and reduce load and bottlenecks in your topology. Either way, follow the lab instructions and you are creating a sinkhole. You may even be advertising extra networks just to attract traffic for analysis (like a Honeypot idea). Just watch what’s being asked, but that’s the concept of a sinkhole. Blackhole routing on the other hand wants to kill traffic. Simply enough, we could go to all of our routers and install some Null0 routes. In real life, this is not a scalable approach. Hence the term remotely-triggered blackhole routing, and we’ll use BGP. Killing a route via a routing protocol is not a simple concept. No matter how hard we try when advertising a route, Null0 is not a valid next-hop to pass along to someone else! So every router needs to have a seed route to Null0. Pick something that isn’t used. Ip route 1.1.1.1 255.255.255.255 null0 That goes on every single router now. Of course, we would also have BGP setup between all of our internal routers. Perhaps not really moving any “real” routing information, just used to kill things. Now we need the trigger. On a central router (wherever an admin is anyway) we’ll do our maintenance for what routes we want to kill. Ip route 192.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 null0 tag 86 ip route 100.100.100.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86 ip route 200.200.200.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86 Notice the tag on those static routes. This will be used for redistribution to help only get the “bad” routes from a router that may actually have many other static routes. Ok, not in the real lab, but we’re pretending that the skills we learn on our way to CCIE have some real-life intrinsic value, right? So once we have decided on our central router what routes we want to kill everywhere, then we pass them out through BGP. Route-map KillRoutes permit 10 Match tag 86 Router bgp 65000 Redistribute static route-map KillRoutes That all seems very simple, right? Well, yes it does, but it won’t help us. At this point, all of our iBGP routers would see the central router as the next hop for each of the routes. Ok, yes, that creates a blackhole. Because it pulls all of the packets into the middle of our network and then kills them locally with a Null0 next-hop. But we are wasting LOTS of bandwidth in doing this. Always filter as close to the source as possible. Good design rules! In order to do this, we need to change the next hop of the route from our central router’s IP address to that of the distributed Null0 route (1.1.1.1 in my example). Route-map NH-Change permit 10 Match tag 86 Set ip next-hop 1.1.1.1 Route-map NH-Change permit 20 Router bgp 65000 Neighbor x.x.x.x route-map NH-Change out (repeat for each of your neighbors unless you’re using peer groups!) The last permit statement of the route-map was to pass-through any other routes that you may want to run in BGP unchanged. Only make the next-hop change for those routes that are evil. You could also set this next-hop within the original redistribute route-map. I just split it out for pointing out the differences. At this point, all of your other routers have learned some routes via iBGP, with a next-hop of 1.1.1.1 and since they have a local static route to Null0 for that next hop, all routes learned this way will be killed. We have now used blackhole routing in a remotely-triggered manner. Kinda cool, huh? Not difficult either, just a matter of thinking about what we are trying to accomplish. As noted, these techniques have been listed more explicitly on both the Security (2.0) and Service Provider CCIE tracks. I don’t see any reason why they can’t be used in Routing & Switching as well, so it never hurts to think these things through! For some extra information, check out: scenario carefully. Makes notes and diagrams as necessary, but think like the router does. Think things through one step at a time and all of these complicated things suddenly become much easier. Cheers, Scott Scott Morris is IPexpert's Vice President of Curriculum and Senior Technical Instructor. With over 20 years of technical training and consulting experience and a wealth of technical certifications, Scott Morris has proven to be among the elite in the technical training industry. Scott is one of the few people in the world who currently hold four separate CCIE certifications, but is one-of-a-kind by having added Juniper Network's expert level certification. He is also actively preparing for the CCIE Voice. Scott has years of experience both writing and teaching CCIE lab preparation materials with an outstanding track record of success. Over the past seven years, Scott has also been involved in many aspects of training directly for Cisco's internal staff on a variety of advanced technical topics. His knowledge and real-world experiences have been sought after for many projects. Scott has also participated in editing, writing and reviewing training books for Cisco Press, Wylie, Sybil, Que. Publishing and McGraw-Hill. His contributing author work includes Cisco Press' Managing Cisco Network Security book ( ISBN: 1578701031) - Chapters on the PIX Firewall; and Cisco Press' CCIE Practical Studies, Vol. 2 (ISBN: 1587050722) - Chapter on Multicast. Scott can be reached

sinkhole routing.

While this may sound a lot

like some Star Trek episode, it’s important for us to understand what each is,

and more so how to implement them. Sinkholes are designed to attract traffic

and keep it (for analysis or whatever reason). Blockhouse, on the other hand,

are designed to attract traffic and never let it be seen again.

In larger networks (and

what we simulate in our CCIE labs) both of these techniques are typically done

via BGP. So let’s start with the sinkhole idea. To create a sinkhole, we want

to attract traffic. The first question we need to ask is Why?

Whenever you advertise a

network out, you inadvertently attract traffic to that IPs. That traffic may

be good, or it may be bad. From a security perspective, I’m sure everyone has

heard the term Honeypot used before. There is a specific purpose to attract

traffic.

So let’s say that you have

a /24 network advertising to the Internet through various connections. Traffic

can come in and wend its way through your network to the destination network

segment. You notice a Dos attack, or some huge amount of traffic towards one of

your web servers. Where do you secure against this? How do you secure against

it? Are you still moving traffic all the way through your network to one final

router before the segment? Are you tying up all your link’s bandwidth while

doing this?

Sinkholes spread

throughout your network are a way to break apart and analyze the traffic,

perhaps cleaning it and moving the good stuff on through. But multiple routers

would need a focal point, or different way to route that traffic. You may

simply change the destination for a single IP out of that /24. Most-specific

routing always wins, so that’s an easy way. Maybe you have multiple analysis

points in your network to segment the traffic and reduce load and bottlenecks in

your topology.

Either way, follow the lab

instructions and you are creating a sinkhole. You may even be advertising extra

networks just to attract traffic for analysis (like a Honeypot idea). Just

watch what’s being asked, but that’s the concept of a sinkhole.

Blackhole routing on the

other hand wants to kill traffic. Simply enough, we could go to all of our

routers and install some Null0 routes. In real life, this is not a scalable

approach. Hence the term remotely-triggered blackhole routing, and we’ll use

BGP. Killing a route via a routing protocol is not a simple concept. No matter

how hard we try when advertising a route, Null0 is not a valid next-hop to pass

along to someone else!

So every router needs to

have a seed route to Null0. Pick something that isn’t used.

Ip route 1.1.1.1

255.255.255.255 null0

That goes on every single

router now. Of course, we would also have BGP setup between all of our internal

routers. Perhaps not really moving any “real” routing information, just used to

kill things. Now we need the trigger. On a central router (wherever an admin

is anyway) we’ll do our maintenance for what routes we want to kill.

Ip route 192.0.0.0

255.0.0.0 null0 tag 86

ip route 100.100.100.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86

ip route 200.200.200.0 255.255.255.0 null0 tag 86

Notice the tag on those

static routes. This will be used for redistribution to help only get the “bad”

routes from a router that may actually have many other static routes. Ok, not

in the real lab, but we’re pretending that the skills we learn on our way to

CCIE have some real-life intrinsic value, right?

So once we have decided on

our central router what routes we want to kill everywhere, then we pass them out

through BGP.

Route-map KillRoutes

permit 10

Match tag 86

Router bgp 65000

Redistribute static route-map KillRoutes

That all seems very

simple, right? Well, yes it does, but it won’t help us. At this point, all of

our iBGP routers would see the central router as the next hop for each of the

routes. Ok, yes, that creates a blackhole. Because it pulls all of the packets

into the middle of our network and then kills them locally with a Null0

next-hop. But we are wasting LOTS of bandwidth in doing this. Always filter as

close to the source as possible. Good design rules!

In order to do this, we

need to change the next hop of the route from our central router’s IP address to

that of the distributed Null0 route (1.1.1.1 in my example).

Route-map NH-Change permit

10

Match tag 86

Set ip next-hop 1.1.1.1

Route-map NH-Change permit 20

Router bgp 65000

Neighbor x.x.x.x route-map NH-Change out

(repeat for each of your neighbors unless you’re using peer groups!)

The last permit statement

of the route-map was to pass-through any other routes that you may want to run

in BGP unchanged. Only make the next-hop change for those routes that are

evil. You could also set this next-hop within the original redistribute

route-map. I just split it out for pointing out the differences.

At this point, all of your

other routers have learned some routes via iBGP, with a next-hop of 1.1.1.1 and

since they have a local static route to Null0 for that next hop, all routes

learned this way will be killed.

We have now used blackhole

routing in a remotely-triggered manner. Kinda cool, huh? Not difficult either,

just a matter of thinking about what we are trying to accomplish.

As noted, these techniques

have been listed more explicitly on both the Security (2.0) and Service Provider

CCIE tracks. I don’t see any reason why they can’t be used in Routing &

Switching as well, so it never hurts to think these things through!

For some extra

information, check out:

scenario carefully. Makes notes and diagrams as necessary, but think like the

router does. Think things through one step at a time and all of these

complicated things suddenly become much easier.

Cheers,

Scott

Scott Morris is

IPexpert's Vice President of Curriculum and Senior Technical Instructor.

With over 20 years of technical training and consulting experience and

a wealth of technical certifications, Scott Morris has proven to be among the

elite in the technical training industry. Scott is one of the few people in the

world who currently hold four separate CCIE certifications, but is one-of-a-kind

by having added Juniper Network's expert level certification. He is also

actively preparing for the CCIE Voice. Scott has years of experience both

writing and teaching CCIE lab preparation materials with an outstanding track

record of success.

Over the past seven years, Scott has also been involved in many aspects of

training directly for Cisco's internal staff on a variety of advanced technical

topics. His knowledge and real-world experiences have been sought after for many

projects.

Scott has also participated in editing, writing and reviewing training books for

Cisco Press, Wylie, Sybil, Que. Publishing and McGraw-Hill. His contributing

author work includes Cisco Press' Managing Cisco Network Security book ( ISBN:

1578701031) - Chapters on the PIX Firewall; and Cisco Press' CCIE Practical

Studies, Vol. 2 (ISBN: 1587050722) - Chapter on Multicast. Scott can be reached

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